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Donald MacRae offers a welcome and succinct intervention from an experienced 
regulation practitioner. MacRae argues convincingly of the perils of unchecked 
standard setting in the name of safety – the well known twin ills of additional burdens 
on industry and constraints on individuals’ liberty. While over-regulation in the name 
of safety may perhaps fairly be seen as Perrowian ‘normal accident’ of administrators’ 
encounters with uncertainty, MacRae rightly notes the unresolved and thorny 
questions about the legitimacy and accountability of those who ‘increase the safety 
ratchet’ whatever their motivation. Who are qualified to exercise these judgements? 
How do we ensure they can be held responsible for their actions (or inactions)? 
Recognition of this risk of setting the wrong standards has triggered two responses 
from within the standard setting community – specifically the work of UNECE WP.6 
and INMETRO in Brazil. This commentary ponders what these nascent responses 
themselves imply for legitimacy and accountability and whether regulatory impact 
assessment offers a panacea to over-regulation. 
 
(Why) are legitimacy and accountability needed at all? In determining whether or not 
new safety standards need to be set, any standard setter or de facto regulator requires 
their actions to be accepted but they must also be able motivate behavioural responses 
(Black, 2008: 148). To use MacRae’s arboreal example, only would-be regulators that 
command legitimacy, and are seen to be accountable, will be able to convince 
industry that they should halt their calls for a standard to be set on tree safety 
inspection and reassure citizens that they can go on country walks safely. 
 
The task here should not be underestimated. Standard setting bodies’ lack of formal 
regulatory powers and non-state character means that there is no legal authority for 
them to motivate compliance. This challenge is complicated further where these 
bodies are comprised of various individual organisations which have formed a 
specialist network around an issue (Black, 2008: 148 on enrolment). In this 
‘polycentric governance regime’ (Black, 2008), legitimacy is socially, not legally, 
constructed and contested. In the context of risk governance, such would-be 
regulators are concerned with the perception of both the regulated and the recipients 
on whose behalf a standard is (or is not) being set – what Black calls the ‘legitimacy 
community’ (2008). So, legitimacy is bestowed by others, and is a function of the 
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alignment of the beliefs and actions of the regulator with the beliefs and expectations 
of this wider and heterogeneous legitimacy community. 
 
Legitimacy is about achieving, or at least working toward, a congruence of values 
across all those affected by action or inaction by standard setters. Specifically, 
organisations that claim regulatory roles but lack traditional legal authority face 
challenges on three fronts (Black, 2008: 145-149). They must aim to be: 
• pragmatically persuasive – convincing legitimacy communities that the action 
they advise and their decision-making processes and structures reflect 
society’s interests; 
• normatively engaged and able to show that they are dealing with the issue in 
hand in an appropriate way; and, most importantly,  
• cognitively plausible – passing the test that they are necessary in the first place. 
 
What claims to legitimacy can be made by the two quality assurance responses 
outlined by MacRae? INMETRO is clearly aware of the need to both reflect and 
inform citizens on the risks they should take seriously and how to approach safety 
claims made for products. Of course, establishing legitimacy across such a wide social 
base is a high wire act for INMETRO – as MacRae points out ‘its very high public 
profile can turn against it if it gets an issue badly wrong’. The UNECE WP.6 has 
positioned itself as a hub with which a selective legitimacy community of standard 
setters can engage. The task here is to develop methods for risk prioritization which 
this network can take down to industry and, ultimately, to the citizen-consumer. 
Though UNECE may not need to directly win the hearts and minds of wider society, 
its position at the centre of a complex network of linked actors does mean that 
society’s interests and perceptions will impinge on its work. Standard setters, 
regulated industries, NGOs and governments all have their own legitimacy claims to 
be met (see Black, 2008: 147-148) and the linkages between these actors will 
necessitate the adoption of positions that the UNECE may not otherwise have 
contemplated. 
 
Claims that the UNECE should be a hub around which standard setters can converge 
are bolstered by its willingness to consult with that community. How it communicates 
its survey findings and involves its network in setting its agenda will play a key role 
in meeting the normative legitimacy challenge. INMETRO, by contrast, reports 
directly to citizens cashing out very publicly the tradeoffs and countervailing risks 
that result from intervention in standard setting. What is less clear is its input 
legitimacy. It is unclear, for example, what role legitimacy communities have in 
setting the agenda that INMETRO follows. 
 
Finally, on cognitive legitimacy, one way of assessing how necessary UNECE and 
INMETRO’s and their work actually is would be to ask the counterfactual. What 
would the world of standard setting be like if they did not exist? INMETRO can make 
substantial claims to necessity, their technical expertise gives industry in Brazil an 
institutional focal point and the civic engagement it encourages through Fantastico 
serves an important educative function. It is, of course, too early to judge the 
necessity of the UNECE initiative. Suffice it to say that its challenge must be to prove 




Accountability mechanisms are the central means by which legitimacy communities 
can control the activities and values of would-be regulators and, if they diverge, bring 
the regulators’ standards closer to their own (Black, 2008: 149). As a federal agency, 
INMETRO is subject to the traditional forms of oversight – legislature and court. In 
addition, the agency gives a very public account of itself and its work through its 
weekly television broadcasts. UNECE’s distance from the centre of government rules 
out traditional democratic and legal oversight mechanisms (see Scott, 2000) as well as 
more innovative media-based strategies. Thus, we are not assessing the extent to 
which UNECE is, or should be, subject to formal systematic scrutiny and sanction. 
This is important, not merely because it addresses the non-state, non-regulatory reality 
of the polycentric world of standard setting, but because it also helps avoid claims that 
accountability can only be ensured through a never ending chain of oversight bodies 
scrutinising other oversight bodies. Rather, we are interested in extended types of 
accountability through which trust can be established in polycentric settings (Scott, 
2000). Both UNECE and INMETRO suggest that accountability can founded in an 
evidence-based approach to standard setting. In what ways can regulatory impact 
assessment help actors give account for their actions? 
 
RIA deploys analytical techniques – cost benefit analysis (CBA), most notably – to 
identify the costs, benefits and countervailing risks associated with a product or 
prospective intervention. The analytical cornerstone of better regulation, RIAs aim is 
to rationalize prospective regulatory action using codified methodologies to create a 
consistent, standardized approach. The fundamental goal here is economic efficiency. 
Certainly, the epistemic findings of RIAs can be readily summarized and 
communicated across a wide network of actors using a scorecard format and common 
analytical language (see Renda, 2006). However, we also know that RIA can be a 
barrier to integrating the latest evidence into the regulatory process (Dunlop, 2010). 
Multiple case studies also show it is used a figleaf for political and symbolic 
processes and that, despite its consultative component, its use as a vehicle for wider 
social dialogue should not be overstated (Dunlop et al, 2010). Moreover, a good deal 
of salient, noncodified information is lost or omitted in RIA summaries and the 
objectivity of the analysis overstated (Kysar, 2010). The value judgements that 
determine what evidence is used and how it is weighted, for example, in cost-benefit 
analyses, are exercised out of general view (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004). But, if 
our concern is the accountability and legitimacy of oversight arrangements this lack of 
transparency is problematic particularly in issues and products characterized by 
uncertainty. How, and whether, these data debates are resolved and communicated 
determines the capacity of RIA tools and procedures to meet multiple communities’ 
various legitimacy claims about what is morally and culturally appropriate, what 
meets their interests and what is necessary in risk regulation. 
 
RIAs are not objectivity machines, rather the knowledge they produce and functions 
they serve are negotiated on the ground. This is no reason to reject RIA as a useful 
tool in risk regulation and standardization of course. Indeed, the contingent character 
of RIA processes may be an asset to standard setters trying to satisfy a variety of 
stakeholders. The initial commitment of a standard setter to carry out the RIA is an 
incomplete contract that can be shaped by these legitimacy communities. Where 
standard setters are prepared to facilitate these framing contests, and accept that these 
often lead to outcomes that may be very different from their original aims, the 
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